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IN THE SUP·REME COURT
OF THE STA T'E Q:F UTAH
srrATE OF

U~rAI-I,

Plat'ntiff -Respondent,
vs.

Case
No. 9731

'VALLACE PLUM:,
Defendant-A ppella;nt.

BRIEF OF RESP·ONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The appellant was convicted of burglary in the
third degree upon his plea of guilty and thereafter
moved the court to set aside his plea of guilty and enter
a plea of not guilty. It is from the denial of the motion
to withdraw the plea of guilty that defendant has
appealed.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court denied the appellant's motion to
set aside his plea of guilty, made after judgment had
been entered, appellant sentenced, and a commitment to
the State Prison issued.

1
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RELIEF SOUGHT

0~

APPEAL

The State of Utah contends that the trial court
should be affirmed in its ruling refusing to allow appellant to withdraw his plea of guilty.
STATEMENT OF FACT'S
The appellant, after full preliminary hearing, was
arraigned on the charge of third degree burglary on
lVfarch 30, 1962 and entered a plea of not guilty (R. 4)~
Trial was set upon the charge on :May 10, 1962. On May
10, 1962, the appellant appeared before the court, with
counsel, and announced that he desired to change his
plea. The court permitted the appellant to withdraw his
plea of not guilty. Thereafter, the appellant entered a
plea of guilty and the court referred the matter to the
D'epartment of Adult Probation and Parole for a presentence report (R. 21). On lVlay 25, 1962, the appellant
came before the court for pronouncement of sentence
(R. 23). The appellant's counsel was allowed to make a
statement in his behalf, in which he requested probation.
The appellant responded to questions the court put to
him. During the course of the hearing on the sentence,
the following occurred :
''[:MR. WADE:] I would like to recommend
to the Court that he be placed on probation. It
is my understanding that the District Attorney's
office will also make that recommendation to the
Court.

MR. IVINS: I am sorry I didn't understand
that.
MR. 'VADE: I think it's my understanding
2
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that the Distriet Attorney's office ,,·ould make that
recommendation to the Court?

nlR. IYINS: 'l,he State does recommend probation in this rase, Your Honor."
(R. 23)
The court, however, noted that the appellant had a
prior criminal record and, being advised as to the appellanes record, the court sentenced him to the State Prison.
On the same day, :May 25, 1962, the appellant was committed to the State Prison. On the 31st of May, 1962,
a motion to allow the appellant to withdraw his plea of
guilty was prepared along with two affidavits in support
of the motion; and on June 1, 1962, they were filed with
the clerk of the court (R. 6-10).
The appellant's motion requested withdrawal of the
plea of guilty ''on the grounds and for the reason that
said plea was induced to be entered by promises and
representations of the State that the defendant would
be placed on probation if he would enter such a plea."
(R. 6). The affidavit of the appellant's counsel, however,
shows a different fact situation (R. 7). Paragraphs 3,
5 and 6 thereof state the following:
"3. That in the course of these conversations, Mr. Ivins approached said Norman Wade,
the deponent herein, with the proposition that if
the defendant herein would plead 'guilty' to the
charge of third degree burglary against him, that
he would recommen.d to the probation department
and also to the judge that Mr. Plum be placed on
probation. 1\Ir. Ivins further represented that on
this recommendation there would be a very good
3
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chance that Mr. Plum would be placed on probation.
* * *

"5. That Mr. Wade advised Mr. Plum that
he had a case that was very difficult to win in
light of what deponent knew; and that under
the circumstances l\fr. \Vade felt that it was best
that he plead 'guilty' to this charge, as it was
probably the only possibility he had to get probation, and Mr. Wade had been assured by Mr.
Ivins that the chance was very good for probation.
"6. Upon this representation and upon the
persuasion of Norman Wade, ~ir. Plum finally
agreed to plead 'guilty' to the charge, but Mr.
Plum did not at any time state to Mr. Wade that
he was guilty at any time."
Further, the appellant's affidavit recited the following (R. 9):
"That prior to the trial of the cause, his
attorney, Norman Wade, came to him with an
offer from the State, that if he would plead
guilty to the cause, that the State would recommend probation for him to both the probation
department and to the sentencing judge; and
that in lright of this, he would in likelihood be
granted probation, and placed on probation.***"
(Emphasis added.)
On June 29, 1962, a hearing wa::s held before Judge
R. L. Tuckett on the appellant's 1notion to set aside the
ple1a of guiUy. The appellant testified that he was 23
years old, ahnost 2-t, had con1pleted the tenth grade, and
was working for the State Road Connnission at the
time of the occurrence of the criminal incident (R. 20).
The appellant testified as to his presence at the burglary,
4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

but denied knowledge or participation. He did not testify
as to any of the 1natter that allegedly induced his plea
of guilty. Further, at the time of argu1nent on the
motion, appellant's counsel stated:

"* * * In the course of the preparation for
trial he was offered this partic1tlar hope that if
he would plead guilty he would have a recommendation from the prosec'tdin,g attorney's office
to both the parole department and the sentencing
judge he be placed on parole probation, * * *."
(Emphasis added.) (R. 22, p. 10).
Further, the record shows the following statement
by the prosecutor (R. 22, p. 12) :
"Your Honor, 1n order that the record may
be straight in this matter, the facts as they evolved
prior to the entry of plea were these: Mr. Wade
came to n1y office and said he thought he had a
very difficult case, and with the evidence that I
had I was inclined to agree. He said, 'What
would the State do in this case if we changed
our plea to enter a plea of guilty~' I said, •In
view of the Defendant's age, if he's not been convicted of a previous felony, I will give you my
assurance as the assistant prosecutor that I will
recommend probation.' Now, I have had Mr.
Roundy dig out the minutes of his reporter's
notes of the proceedings at which Mr. Plum was
sentenced and they definitely reveal that this
promise was kept; that the assistant prosecutor
did recon1mend probation. In spite of this the
court, in view of the man's long record of arrests
without convictions, felt that a judgment of the
statutory sentence should be imposed. * * *"
l\[r. vVade then agreed that this statement was cor5
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rect (R. 22, p. 13). The court eonnnented at the time of
the hearing R. 22, p. 11) :
"The difficulty with this situation is that it'~5
a matter of bargaining. The Defendant entered
a plea of guilty and then when he gets a judgment
he doesn't like it."
Thereafter, the court denied the appellant's motion.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE APPELLANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF GUILTY
WHERE IT WAS MADE AFTER JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
AND COMMITMENT.

It is submitted that the trial court could properly
have denied the appellant's motion on the grounds that
it could not entertain such a motion under Section 77-24-3,
Utah Code Annotated 1953. This section provides:
"A plea of guilty can be put in only by the
defendant himself, in open court, except upon
information or indichnent against a corporation,
in which case it 1nay be put in by counsel. The
court may at any time before judgment, upon a
plea of guilty, permit it to be withdrawn and a
plea of not guilty substituted."
Thus, the plain language of the statute indicates
that defendant will only be allowed to withdraw his
plea before judgment is entered. If it were construed
to allow him to withdraw his plea at any time, the word8
'·'before judgment" would be superf-luous. It is a general
legal Inaxiin of statutory construction that meaning
6
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should be given to all the words of a statute if possible.
Thus, Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd Ed. Vol.
2, Sec. -1:705, notes :
'• It is an ele1nentary rule of construction
that effect must be given, if possible, to every
word, clause and sentence of a statute. A statute
should be construed so that effect is given to all
its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative
or superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that
one section will not destroy another unless the
provision is the result of obvious mistake or
error."

Applying the above rule to Section 77-24-3, l"T.C.A.
1953, it would appear that the court could not consider
a motion under that statute after the appellant in this
case had been adjudged guilty, sentenced and committed.
The State recognizes that there is a split of authority
on the issue as to when a judgment can be withdrawn,
22 C.J.S., Crimt'nal Law, 421( 4), p. 1155; 4 "'Wharton's
Criminal Law and Procedure 1909. However, the State
submits that states having similar statutes to that of
Utah have recognized the b~ter rule to be that after
judgment, such motions are not proper. The Arizona
statute is similar to that of Utah, and in St.(l)te v. Telavera, 76 Ariz. 183, 261 P. 2d 997 (1953), the Arizona
Supreme Court held that the plea of guilty of a 17 year
old rapist could not be set aside after commitment.
The Arizona court stated :
"It will be seen that the authority of the court
to permit a withdrawal of a plea of guilty is
limited to the period prior to the pronouncement
of sentence and even then it is discretionary with
the
instant
case
was
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sentenced on August 13. The judgment of commitment and the statement of facts required by
law to accompany the judgment committing the
defendant to the state penitentiary were signed
by the trial judge on that date. \Vhile the record
does not show upon what date defendant was
received at the penitentiary it is reasonable to
assume that he was committed thereto soon after
August 13 and certainly long before September
12. When the court denied defendant's motion
to withdraw his plea of guilty and to enter a
plea of not guilty, he had long before that time
entered upon the execution of his sentence. Therefore in addition to the above statutory limitation
upon the power of the court to permit the withdrawal of a plea of guilty and enter a plea of
not guilty it is enjoined from doing so after
defendant had entered upon the execution of his
sentence under the rule laid down in State v.
Mcl{elvey, 30 Ariz. 265, 246 P. 550."
The California court has adopted a similar rule
based on the California statute 1 which is the same as
Utah's. People v. Grgurevich, 153 Cal. App. 2d 806, 315
P. 2d 39'1 (1957). Thus in People v. TVade, 53 Cal. 2d
322, 348 P. 2d 116 (1959), a unanimous Califon1ia
Supreme Court held that after judgn1ent, coram nobis
was the appropriate remedy. The court stated:
"The record reveals that at the hearing set to
order the execution of sentence, after judgment
had been rendered, the defendant attempted to
withdraw her plea of guilty. She was not jorined
by counsel in this attempt. The trial court properly ruled that it had no jurisdiction to entertain
1

Cal. Penal Code, Sec. 1018. This statute is also cited in appellant's
brief.
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8

such a motion after judgrnent had been entered.
( J>Pn. Code, §1018.) As the case is being remanded
to the trial court as to this defendant in any
event, she will be free to petition for a writ of
error coram nobis, the proper procedure for a
defendant seeking to obtain leave to withdraw a
plea of guilty after judgment." 348 P. 2d at 128.
Iowa has so ruled with an apparently similar statute,
lmra Code 1950, Sec. 777.15; State v. Harper, 220 Iowa
315, :258 N.W. 886 (1935). See also Commonwe,alth v.
Pllchw, :271 :\lass. 21, 171 N.E. 53 (1930), and Commonlccalth v. Dascalakis, 246 ~Iass. 12, 140 N.E. 470 (1923),
also refusing to allow such relief. The New Jersey court
in State v. Oats, 32 N.J. Super 435, 108 A. 2d 641 (1954),
held that it would only grant relief after judgment if
habeas corpus or coram nobis would lie.
It does not appear that this Court has ruled on the
l~tah statute, since in State v. Lee Lim, 79 Utah 68, 7 P.
2d 8:23 (1932), the Court denied the defendant's motion
where it was presented prior to entry of a corrected
sentence. It is submitted that, based upon the clear
statutory language and the above court rulings, the
rtah statute should be construed as not allowing the
withdrawal of a plea of guilty after judgrnent. Certainly
finality of judgments should be accorded recognition
and an accused should not be allowed to gamble with the
court's time and power. It is submitted that the Legislature foresaw just such circumstances as those of the
instant case and desired to foreclose the court from
being besieged with motions from defendants who, having
plead to the charge, disliked the consequences.
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Additionally, it should be noted that in 1935 the
American Law Institute recommended enactment of a
Model Code of ·Criminal Procedure. Therein, the Utah
statute was cited in support of the proposition that a
withdrawal could be had by an accused but withdrawal
was limited to pre-sentence motions. It is, therefore,
submitted that the motion of the appellant, coming after
judgment, sentence and commitment, was not timely.

POINT II
ASSUMING 77-24-3, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953,
DOES NOT PROHIBIT A MOTION TO WITHDRAW A PLEA
OF GUILTY AFTER JUDGMENT, THE TRIAL COURT HAD
DISCRETION TO GRANT OR DENY THE MOTION, AND
IT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION.

In St.ate v. Lee Lim, supra, the Utah court held that
the trial court had discretion under what is now Section
77 -24-9·, U.C.A. 1953, to grant or deny a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty prior to final judgment. If it be
determined that the above referenced statute does not
prohibit such motions after judgment, the same rule,
that of discretion vested in the trial court, would apply.
Thus, in 146 A.L.R. 1431, the rule ris stated:
''In a number of cases the appellate courts,
without referring to any particular statute, have
held that a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty,
after the plea has been received by the court
and judg1nent entered thereon, is addressed to
the sound discretion of the trial court, and that
the action of the court on such motion will not
be disturbed unless a clear abuse of discretion is
shown."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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See also, 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, 421(2); Abbott,
Trial Practice, ±th Ed., Sec. 118. Thus, it
becomes necessary to determine whether or not, based
on the facts of the instant case, the trial court abused
its discretion. The appellant has cited the general rule
that where fraud, duress or some official overreacillng
is manifest, a court should set aside a plea of guilty.
However, in the instant case, there is no evidence of
fraud, duress or unlawful action. At best, the evidence
shows that the Assistant District Attorney offered to
merely make a recommendation of probation for appellant, which was done. There was no firm promise that
probation would be granted, nor did the prosecutor fail
to keep his pr01nise. Further, the appellant in his affidavit makes it clear that he was under no misapprehension of law or fact, for it recites as a fact the understanding that the State would only "recommend probation," and a ''likelihood" of it being obtained (R. 9).
Additionally, the appellant acted after thoughtful advice
of counsel and deliberation. Appellant was not a minor,
immature, nor inexperienced in matters of criminal law.
It clearly appears that he was aware of the consequences
of his plea. Appellant's testimony on the merits of the
case can hardly be called obviously exculpatory. Thus,
there are no facts warranting a conclusion of official
overreaching. State v. Spiers, 12 U. 2d 14, 361 P. 2d 509
()rimin(ltl

(1961).

At best, the record discloses that appellant, concluding that his case was most probably without merit
for trial, plead guilty on advice of counsel, with full
understanding of the consequences along with the hope

11
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that he would receive probation. This is clearly not a
sufficient basis to claim that the plea should be withdrawn or that the trial judge abused his discretion in
not allowing appellant to withdraw his plea. Thus, in
22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, 421(3)e, it is said:
"It is frequently stated that the mere fact
that accused, knowing his rights and the consequences of his act, hoped or believed that by
pleading guilty he would receive a shorter sentence or a milder punishment than that which
would fall to his lot after trial and conviction
by jury, presents no ground for the withdrawal
of his plea or the exercise of the court's discretion, and some authorities state the rule more
broadly so as to include a case where accused
was led so to hope or believe by his counsel or
anyone else. It has been held that the court does
not abuse its discretion in denying leave to withdraw a guilty plea even though such plea was
induced by the prosecution's promise with respect
to its recommendation as to sentence and the
court refused to follow such recommendation.''
Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed., Sec. 118,
notes:
"The nwre fact that an accused, knowing his
rights and the consequences of his act, hoped or
believed, or \Yas led to believe, that he would
receive shorter sentence or a milder punishment,
or some other favor, by entering a plea of guilty,
than that which would fall to his lot after trial
and conviction by a jury, presents no ground for
pennittt'ng the withdrawal of the plea of guilty."
In Futtennan v. Cnited States, 202 F.2d 185 (D.C.
Cir. 1952), the court determined that no basis existed for

12
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granting withdrawal of a plea of guilty because of advice
of counsel and accompanied by an expectancy of probation. Tlw court stated:
••And based upon that record, we are in
complete agreement with the trial judge that appellants were fully advised by 'able and vigorous
counsel' as well as by the court concerning the
charges against them. As to counsel's representation concerning probation, they were clearly those
of hope and not of promise. Thus appellants failed
to prove that the withdrawals of their guilty pleas
were necessary in order to 'correct manifest injustice.' "
In a case almost identical with the instant case, the
facts were held to afford no basis for relief by the Supreme Court of Illinois. People v. Enso~, 319 Ill. 255,
149 N.E. 737 (1925 ). The accused contended he plead
guilty to burglary upon advice of counsel and upon promises of the prosecutor that he would recommend probation and, further, he contended that he had a meritorious
defense. The court denied the appellant's contention,
noting:

'' * * * The above cases also recognize the rule
that, if an accused, knowing his rights and the
consequences of his act, hopes or believes that by
pleading guilty he will receive a shorter sentence
or milder punishment or some other favor than
he would upon a trial and conviction by a jury,
he has no right to withdraw his plea of guilty if
the sentence or punishment i1nposed upon him by
the court is not what he hoped or believed it
would be. Such procedure would allow the accused
to speculate upon the supposed clemency of the
judge, and, if his sentence or punishment were not
13
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as he hoped or believed it would be, to retract his
plea and secure a trial before a jury. Pla~ntiff in
error was well advised by counsel, and he should
have known that the state's attorney, even if it
is true that he promised he would recommend
probation, is not the officer vested with the power
of probation, but that it is entirely a function of
the court. The court should, and often does, deny
probation even though recommended by the state's
attorney, where the facts show that the accused is
an unsavory and habitual criminal."
In United States v. Fox, 130 F.2d 56 (3rd Cir. 1942),
cert. den. 63 S.Ct. 74, the court denied relief where the
prosecutor made an agreement and kept it. The court
stated:
''The agreement which was made by the prosecuting authorities was fully kept. So we have a
case where there was neither misunderstanding
at the beginning of what was being agreed to, nor
a failure thereafter to adhere to the agreement.
It is not error to refuse leave to withdraw the plea
if the defendant fully understood his rights, the
nature of the charge against h~m, and the consequences of such a plea."
The fact that after judgment and sentence the defendant claims innocence itself gives no basis for relief.
People v. Moffett, 290 P.2d 667 (Cal.App.). Numerous
cases and authorities support the conclusion that upon
facts l~ke those presented in the instant case, no basis
for relief can be claimed. People v. Griffi-n, 224 P.2d 47
(Cal.App.); People v. McGee, 273 P.2d 883 (Cal.App.);
Gleckma-n v. U-nited States, 16 F.2d 670 (8th Cir.);
People v. Bacciocco, 81 Cal.App. 19, 251 P. 817 (where
entry of plea was made upon promise by the prosecutor
14
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that other charges would be dismissed, which promise
"·as kept). It appears clear then that all the appellant's
claim boils down to is hope of leniency coupled with
advice of counsel. As is noted in 146 A.L.R. 1450:
"As a general rule, reliance on advice of
counsel in entering a plea of guilty is no ground
for allowing ·withdrawal of same after judgment."
And, at page 1442 :
" [the] denial of a 1notion, made after judgment,
to withdraw a plea of guilty, on the alleged
ground, together with possibly others, that the
plea of guilty was made in reliance upon the
promise of len~ency by the court, prosecuting
attorney, or other official, or by the defendant's
own belief that he would receive a lighter sentence by so pleading [does] not under the peculiar
circumstances of the [cases] constitute an abuse
of discretion or warrant reversal:"
The appellant here seeks to accomplish the result
that the court in Ex Parte Gutierrez, 265 P.2d 16 (Cal.
App. 195±), warned against. There the court said :
'' * * * A defendant charged with an offense cannot be permitted to gamble on the anticipated
result of a plea of guilty and when disappointed
in the outcome reestablish a right to a trial. For
aught that appear, the court was fully justified
in refusing to vacate the guilty pleas."
The appellant's case, when examined against the
record and the applicable law, leads to the conclusion that
the appellant has not sustained the burden he must carry
of demonstrating an abuse of discretion by the trial
judge. It appearing that no basis for a claim of abuse of
discretion exists, the decision should be affirmed. State
v. Lee Ltm, supra.
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CONCLUSION
The record in the instant case reflects that the appellant, a mature experienced person, who fully comprehended his situation, plead guilty with the hope of
leniency. Having gambled with the chance of probation,
appellant cannot now contend that because the trial
judge felt that appellant should not receive his hope, he
should now be allowed to gamble with a jury.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER
Attorney General
RONALD N. BOYCE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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